The FCC Just Told You a Firewall Is Not a Password

 In Emergency Communications

# The FCC Just Told You a Firewall Is Not a Password

A station that put every EAS device behind a hardened firewall, set one good password on that firewall, and considered the 2026 security rules satisfied is out of compliance — and has been since the twenty-ninth of this month. That is not a reading of the rule. It is the Commission’s own answer, published on Monday, September 21, 2026, eight days before the rule took effect.

The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau has released a Frequently Asked Questions page on the EAS cybersecurity requirements adopted in FCC 26-38 and codified at section 11.35(d). It is short, it is plain, and it answers seven questions that practitioners have been arguing about since the order came out in June. Read it first; it will take five minutes. What follows is what it changes, and where it sits against *The Emergency Alert System*.

The page is at fcc.gov/faqs-EAS-Cybersecurity-Requirements. The rule behind it is at 91 FR 48289, published July 31, 2026, effective September 29, 2026 — if you want the record copy rather than the summary, that is the one to pull.

## What the rule actually covers, which is more than the EAS box

Start with scope, because this is the answer that will cost people money.

The password requirement at section 11.35(d)(1) does not reach all broadcaster equipment, and it does not reach everything with an IP address. It reaches three categories. One: EAS equipment. Two: studio-transmitter link equipment. Three: any remotely managed equipment that routes, processes, or inserts content into the program stream you transmit to the public and to subscribers.

That third category is the one to read twice. The Commission names audio processors, ad insertion systems, and remotely managed AM and FM radio and DTV transmitters. If a device sits in the program chain, is managed remotely, and touches content on its way to air, the password rule applies to it — whether or not anyone at the facility thinks of it as EAS gear. A remotely managed device that does not route, process, or insert content into the program stream is outside the requirement.

For cable operators the practical consequence is immediate. Ad insertion platforms are in scope. So is anything in the linear path that a vendor reaches to manage.

## Fifteen characters, and what to do when the box will not take fifteen

The rule sets a fifteen-character minimum. Equipment that cannot support a fifteen-character password is not automatically scrap: the Commission permits alternative authentication measures that provide equal or better security than a strong password, and points to the National Institute of Standards and Technology Digital Identity Guidelines — Authentication Assurance Levels 1 through 3 — as the reference. Look-up secrets, out-of-band devices, single-factor and multi-factor one-time passwords, and single-factor and multi-factor cryptographic authentication all qualify. The list is explicitly not exhaustive.

Equipment that can support neither a fifteen-character password nor an equivalent alternative must be replaced, unless you obtain a waiver from the Commission. Keep this distinct from the patching question below; they are separate rules with separate answers.

Dictionary words are permitted inside a passphrase. A multiword passphrase is acceptable so long as the whole of it runs to at least fifteen characters. What the rule prohibits is a single dictionary word standing alone, for the obvious reason — it falls to brute force in seconds.

## The trap: a firewall does not satisfy the password rule

Now the traps, because this is where a well-run facility can still fail an inspection.

The password requirement at section 11.35(d)(1) and the network segmentation requirement at section 11.35(d)(3) are independent obligations, and you must comply with both. Putting equipment behind a firewall or a virtual private network does not discharge the password requirement for that equipment. The Commission is explicit: even where the firewall or VPN itself uses a strong password, the equipment behind it must carry its own strong password or an equivalent alternative.

And every device behind that firewall needs its own unique fifteen-character password. Not one shared credential for the protected segment — one per device. If a facility runs several IP-connected devices in the programming chain, each of them carries a distinct credential.

Don’t confuse two separate requirements. Segmentation protects the path. Passwords protect the box. Doing one well has never excused the other.

## End-of-life equipment: you are not required to replace it, and that is not the end of it

Section 11.35(d)(2) does not require an EAS Participant to replace equipment that no longer receives security patches or software updates from its manufacturer. That is the direct answer, and it is more permissive than many expected.

The qualification matters more than the answer. Manufacturers implement a good deal of Part 11 compliance through software updates, and a participant running unsupported equipment remains fully liable for every other EAS requirement those updates would have delivered. You are not cited for the missing patch; you are cited for the rule the patch existed to satisfy. The Bureau, for its part, strongly encourages participants to prioritize replacing end-of-life and obsolete remotely managed devices.

In plain terms: the rule will not force you to retire that unit, and the rules it can no longer keep you compliant with still will.

## Third parties in the program chain

A broadcaster must ensure that third parties forming part of its program chain have implemented the security practices the rule requires. The reach of that obligation turns on what the third party does.

A third party that routes, processes, or inserts content into the transmission of your programming, acting as your agent, is inside the requirement. A third party that merely supplies content to you is not — supplying content is not inserting content into the transmission, and the rule does not reach a content producer on that basis alone. The test is function, not contract.

## What this adds to the book

The Emergency Alert System | BookBaby Bookshop

*The Emergency Alert System* covers FCC 26-38 and its three pillars — passwords, patching, and network protection — and the account there remains accurate. Chapter 19 places the security baseline within section 11.35 at page 104. Chapter 25 tells the story from the 2013 hijackings through to the order at page 128. The order is cited in the timeline at page 161 and in the Table of Authorities at page 178, with the compliance items at pages 188 and 189 and the maintenance check at page 200.

What the book does not carry, because the guidance did not exist when it went to press, is the operational detail above. Four items are worth writing into your own copy. The fifteen-character minimum, which the book states as “strong passwords.” The subsection structure — (d)(1) passwords, (d)(2) patching, (d)(3) segmentation — which the book cites as section 11.35 generally. The scope beyond EAS equipment to studio-transmitter links, audio processors, ad insertion systems, and remotely managed transmitters. And the firewall trap, which is the one most likely to catch a facility that believes it has already done the work.

All four will be incorporated into the second edition. Nothing in the first edition is contradicted by this guidance.

## What to do this week

Inventory the program chain, not the rack. The question is not which devices are EAS devices; it is which devices are remotely managed and touch content on the way to air. Ad insertion, audio processing, studio-transmitter links, and remotely managed transmitters all belong on that list.

Then set a unique fifteen-character credential on every one of them, whether or not it sits behind a firewall. Where a box cannot take fifteen characters, document the alternative authentication you put in its place and the Authentication Assurance Level it meets. Where it can take neither, you are looking at replacement or a waiver, and it is better to know that in September than to discover it during an inspection.

Finally, write down what you did and when. Section 11.35 has always run on documented, demonstrable compliance, and a security baseline you cannot evidence is a security baseline you will be asked to prove twice.

—

*Greg Phillips is the author of* The Emergency Alert System: A Technical Reference for Broadcast, Cable, and Emergency Management Practitioners *(Think IT Data Solutions LLC, 2026). Corrections and practitioner experience are welcome and will inform the second edition.*

**Sources**

*Federal Communications Commission, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, “Frequently Asked Questions — EAS Cybersecurity Requirements,” updated September 21, 2026. https://www.fcc.gov/faqs-EAS-Cybersecurity-Requirements*

*Modernization of the Nation’s Alerting Systems; Protecting the Nation’s Communications Systems From Cybersecurity Threats, Report and Order, FCC 26-38. 91 FR 48289, published July 31, 2026, effective September 29, 2026; FR document 2026-15601. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/31/2026-15601/*

*Wireless Emergency Alerts; The Emergency Alert System; Modernization of the Nation’s Alerting Systems, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 91 FR 48320, published July 31, 2026; FR document 2026-15600. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/31/2026-15600/*


About the author

Greg Phillips is the founder and principal engineer of Think IT Data Solutions LLC. He has been building and operating physical infrastructure since 1984 — industrial control systems, the U.S. Navy Advanced Electronics Program, satellite communications at Comsat World Systems and Intelsat, and terrestrial transport and video distribution networks since. He founded Think IT Data Solutions in 2013.

Think IT Data Solutions builds and operates the layers underneath AI workloads — power and facilities, network transport, and GPU compute — for organizations that can’t run their most sensitive work on shared infrastructure.

Building something like this and want a second set of eyes on it? greg@thinkitdata.com · 678-643-4065

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